

## Message Text

SECRET

PAGE 01 ANKARA 05613 01 OF 02 040901Z  
ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
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R 040715Z AUG 78  
FM AMEMBASSY ANKARA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 2859  
INFO AMEMBASSY LONDON  
AMEMBASSY PARIS  
AMEMBASSY OTTAWA  
AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
USMISSION USUN NY

S E C R E T SECTION 1 OF 2 ANKARA 5613

EXDIS

E.O. 11652: GDS  
TAGS: PGOV, PEPR, CY  
SUBJECT: POSSIBLE FIVE-POWER INITIATIVE ON CYPRUS

REF STATE 190593 (NOTAL)

1. SUMMARY: FROM OUR VANTAGE POINT A FIVE-POWER INITIATIVE AS NEXT STEP ON CYPRUS WOULD HAVE IMPORTANT ADVANTAGES FOR U.S. INTERESTS HERE COMPARED TO POSSIBILITY OF CONTINUED UNILATERAL USG EFFORTS. DILUTING US ROLE WOULD DIMINISH POTENTIAL NEGATIVE IMPACT OF CYPRUS DEVELOPMENTS ON OUR OTHER BILATERAL PROBLEMS, E.G. NEGOTIATIONS TO REOPEN US BASES. WE ALSO THINK TURKS MIGHT RESPOND BETTER TO MULTILATERAL EFFORT THAT DID NOT CARRY IMPLICATION OF US ARM-TWISTING. WHILE DEPARTMENT'S THINKING ON "MECHANISM" FOR INITIATIVE REMAINS OPEN, WE RECOMMEND THAT CONSIDERATION BE GIVEN TO CASTING EFFORT AS A JOINT EEC-US-CANADIAN INITIATIVE IN ORDER TO AVOID POLITICAL COMPLICATIONS

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WHICH A UN CONNECTION WOULD RAISE HERE. AN ADDED ADVANTAGE IS THAT EEC INTEREST AT THIS MOMENT IN SEEING CYPRUS AND AEGEAN ISSUES RESOLVED BEFORE GREEK ENTRY IS CONSIDERED LEGITIMATE BY ALL PARTIES. END SUMMARY.

2. THIS EMBASSY WELCOMES POSSIBILITY OF FIVE-POWER INITIATIVE AS NEXT STEP IN INTERNATIONAL EFFORTS TO RESUME PROGRESS TOWARD

PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF THE CYPRUS DISPUTE. WE EXPECT THAT  
BILATERAL US-TURKISH RELATIONS WILL BE OVER-BURDEND DURING

COMING MONTHS WITH POSSIBLY DIFFICULT NEGOTIATIONS OVER REOPENING  
OF BASES AND RENEWAL OF NORMAL ARMS-SUPPLY RELATIONSHIP.  
CONTRARY TO THE EXPECTATIONS OF MANY OUTSIDE OBSERVERS, OUR  
PROBLEMS WITH TURKEY MAY BE JUST BEGINNING WITH THE LIFTING  
OF THE EMBARGO. POLICY GOALS AND DIRECTIVES LAID OUT IN SENATE  
AND HOUSE AMENDMENTS HAVE STRUCK RAW POLITICAL NERVES HERE.  
WE EXPECT TURKS WILL BE ABLE TO LIVE WITH LANGUAGE WHICH IS  
LIKELY TO EMERGE FROM CONFERENCE COMMITTEE, BUT EXPRESSION  
OF CONTINUING CONGRESSIONAL DESIRE THAT USG PLAY ACTIVE ROLE  
ON CYPRUS HAS RENEWED TURKISH SENSITIVITY TO THE POSSIBILITY  
OF WHAT THEY MIGHT CONSIDER TO BE "UNACCEPTABLE"US PRESSURE  
OVER CYPRUS. THIS CERTAINLY DOES NOT ARGUE FOR US INACTION,  
BUT IT DOES MAKE THE POSSIBILITY OF SPREADING THE RISK INHERENT  
IN THE FIVE-POWER INITIATIVE PARTICULARLY ATTRACTIVE TO US. TO  
THE EXTENT

THAT OTHERS CAN BE SEEN AS OUT FRONT ON ANY DIPLOMATIC INITIATIVES  
OVER CYPRUS IN COMING MONTHS, OUR NEGOTIATIONS OVER A NEW DEFENSE  
RELATIONSHIP WITH TURKEY WILL BE LESS ENCUMBERED.

3. NO ONE SHOULD EXPECT THE TURKS TO  
WELCOME EXTERNAL PRESSURE OVER CYPRUS IN ANY FORM; THEIGKSTRONG  
PREFERENCE IS TO BE LEFT ALONE WITH GREECE AND THE GREEK  
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CYPRIOTS, AND THEY BELIEVE THAT THE ELIMINATION OF ALL OUTSIDE  
"INTERFERENCE" WOULD NOT ONLY HELP THEM BUT ALSO SPEED A  
MUTUALLY SATISFACTORY SOLUTION. BUT IF THERE IS TO BE AN  
INITIATIVE FROM OUTSIDE THE AREA, WE BELIEVE THEY MIGHT RESPOND  
BETTER TO THE EFFORTS OF A FIVE-POWER CONTACT GROUP OF WESTERN  
NATIONS THAN TO THOSE OF THE USG AONE. REFTEL NOTES THAT THE  
BRITISH, FRENCH, GERMANS AND CANADIANS EACH HAVE A PARTICULAR  
REASON TO BE INVOLVED IN CYPRUS. WE MIGHT ADD THAT FROM THE  
TURKISH VIEWPOINT THE VARIETY OF FIVE-POWER INTERESTS AND CONNECTIONS  
WITH EACH OF THE THREE COUNTRIES OF THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN  
COULD BE TRANSLATED INTO INFLUENCE AND LEVERAGE SPREAD MORE  
EVENLY AMONG THE THREE THAN THEY BELIEVE HAS BEEN THE CASE IN  
THE PAST.

4. THE "MECHANISM" BY WHICH A CONTACT GROUP IS ESTABLISHED  
WILL HAVE AN IMPORTANT EFFECT ON THE INITIAL TURKISH REACTION  
AND MIGHT HAVE A CONTINUING INFLUENCE ON THEIR WILLINGNESS TO  
COOPERATE WITH IT. ANY LINKS OR PERCEIVED LINKS WITH THE SECURITY  
COUNCIL WOULD CAUSE PROBLEMS WITH THE TURKS FOR AT LEAST TWO  
REASONS. FIRST, THEY HAVE A GENERAL CONVICTION THAT THEY DO  
BADLY IN UN FORUMS; ACTIVATION OF THE SECURITY COUNCIL,  
IN PARTICULAR, CARRIES THE CONNOTATION OF POSSIBLE "IMPLEMENTATION"

OF THE VARIOUS UN RESOLUTIONS WHICH ARE SO CENTRAL TO THE GREEK CYPRIOT POSITION. SECONDLY, A FIVE-POWER CONTACT GROUP WHICH SEEMED TO EMERGE FROM THE SECURITY COUNCIL MIGHT WELL IN SOME MINDS BE LINKED WITH KYPRIANOU'S RECENT SUGGESTION THAT THE THE FRENCH CHAIR A COMMITTEE OF SECURITY COUNCIL MEMBERS TO SEEK A SOLUTION. THE SIMILARITY OF THE TWO PROPOSALS WOULD NOT IMPROVE CHANCES OF TURKISH COOPERATION.

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ACTION SS-25

INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 SSO-00 /026 W  
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AMEMBASSY ATHENS  
AMEMBASSY BONN  
AMEMBASSY NICOSIA  
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS  
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EXDIS

5. ONE POSSIBILITY MIGHT SIMPLY BE FOR A CONTACT GROUP TO COME TOGETHER WITHOUT ANY PARTICULAR POINT OF REFERENCE BEYOND THE SHARED INTEREST OF EACH OF THE MEMBERS IN PROMOTING PROGRESS IN CYPRUS. WE ARE CONCERNED THAT IN THIS CASE TURKISH OBSERVERS WOULD ASSUME THAT SUCH AN AMORPHOUS GROUPING WAS SIMPLY A COVER FOR US INITIATIVES. A WASHINGTON OR NEW YORK VENUE FOR THE CONTACT GROUP WOULD CERTAINLY STRENGTHEN THIS ASSUMPTION. WHILE THIS WOULD NOT PRESENT INSUPERABLE DIFFICULTIES HERE, IT WOULD CARRY WITH IT SOME OF THE DISADVANTAGES INHERENT IN FURTHER UNILATERAL USG INITIATIVES.

6. WE THINK THAT A JOINT EEC-US-CANADIAN EFFORT MIGHT HAVE THE BEST CHANCE OF ELICITING THE FULL COOPERATION OF THE TURKISH GOVERNMENT. IF THE BRITISH OR GERMANS WOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE SUCH AN INITIATIVE IN THE CONTEXT OF EEC CONSULTATIONS

IN BRUSSELS, WE AND THE CANADIANS COULD THEN BE IN THE ENVIABLE POSITION OF RESPONDING TO AN EEC OVERTURE FOR OUR COOPERATION.

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FURTHER, A BRUSSELS (OR NICOSIA) VENUE FOR THE CONTACT GROUP WOULD UNDERLINE A PUBLIC IMPRESSION OF EUROPEAN LEADERSHIP, WHATEVER THE REALITIES WITHIN THE GROUP ITSELF. FINALLY, THE EEC ALREADY IS IN THE PROCESS OF WORKING OUT A PROCESS OF INTENSIFIED POLITICAL CONSULTATION WITH BOTH TURKEY AND GREECE; TAKING UP CYPRUS AS AN URGENT MATTER IN THIS PROCESS WOULD SEEM NATURAL AND WOULD CARRY LESS OF A SENSE OF UNWARRANTED, UN-INVITED WESTERN INTRUSION. CYPRUS ALSO HAS AN ASSOCIATION WITH THE EEC, SO THAT ADDING THE CYPRIOTS TO THE PROCESS OF POLITICAL CONSULTATION (WHEN THE SUBJECT IS CYPRUS ITSELF) WOULD SEEM NATURAL. BOTH GREECE AND TURKEY SEEM TO ACCEPT AS LEGITIMATE THE EEC DESIRE TO SEE THE CYPRUS AND AEGEAN ISSUES RESOLVED BEFORE GREEK ENTRY INTO THE COMMUNITY. WHILE THE GREEK CYPRIOTS MIGHT NOT BE AS LIKELY TO SEE AN EEC INITIATIVE IN A SIMILAR POSITIVE LIGHT, IT WOULD NOT PRESENT THEM AS TEMPTING A POLITICAL TARGET AS WOULD A FREE-FLOATING FIVE-POWER GROUP WHICH WOULD HAVE A STRONG NATO CASTE TO IT.

7. WE FRANKLY DON'T KNOW WHETHER THE ABOVE IDEA MAKES ANY SENSE IN TERMS OF EEC POLITICAL DYNAMICS OR WHETHER IT WOULD SERVE OUR OWN DOMESTIC POLITICAL NEED TO BE BOTH ACTIVE AND AND SEEN AS ACTIVE IN PROMOTING A CYPRUS SETTLEMENT. HOWEVER, WE THINK SUCH AN ARRANGEMENT WOULD SERVE PRESENT US PURPOSES HERE IN TURKEY. WE APPRECIATE BEING KEPT INFORMED OF WASHINGTON'S THINKING ON THIS MATTER AND WOULD HOPE AT SOME POINT TO HAVE AN OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON SUBSTANTIVE PAPERS WHICH MIGHT BE ADVANCED IN THE CONTEXT OF SUCH A CONTACT GROUP.

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## Message Attributes

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